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MICHAEL AND ME: A POSTMODERN
FRIENDSHIPO
ALLAN

C. HUTCHINSON*

This paper offers a review of The Limits of Freedom of
Contractas an exercise in postmodern critique and
politics. It examines the extent to which the book is
informed by the postmodern motifs of contingency and
indeterminacy. It attributes difficulties in Michael's
analysis to a lack of postmodern nerve. Finally, it
provides a contrast to a law-and-economics notion of
citizenship which is applied to the problem of racist
practices in the marketplace.

Cet article pr~senteune revue de l'ouvrage The Limits
of Freedom of Contracttout comme un exercice de
critique et politique postmodernes. L'exercice examine
comment le livre est instruit par les motifs
postmodernes de l'6ventualit6 et l'ind6termination.
L'exercice identifie les difficult6s dans l'analyse de
Michael qui rdsultent d'un manque de courage
postmoderne. Enfin, l'exercice se contraste avec la
notion de citoyennet6 d6veloppee par l'cole de droitet-6conomie et applique au problme de pratiques
racistes sur le march6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Michael and me. Two friends from different sides of the
academic tracks. It has always puzzled me how and why Michael and I
could have such different scholarly orientations to law and yet still share
© 1996, A.C. Hutchinson.
* Associate Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. As well as being
prepared specifically for this symposium, a slightly different version of this paper was given at the
Fifth International Conference of Consumer Law held at Osgoode Hall on 25-27 May 1995. Many
thanks to lain Ramsay, Jim Smith, and Wendy Rambo.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

33 No. 2

similar opinions and conclusions on a whole range of topics. Is he not a
fully paid-up shareholder in the Law-and-Economics Enterprise and am
I not a card-carrying member of Critical Legal Studies? Of course, this
compatibility of views may be a greater source of potential
embarrassment to me than to Michael. I might be persuaded regularly
by Michael's gentle rhetoric into momentary lapses of progressive
denial, or it might be confirmation of the fact that I and other CLSers
are not the progressives that we proclaim ourselves to be, but erstwhile
middle-of-the-roaders in radicals' clothing. Nevertheless, I am fairly
confident that I am not so easily persuaded or so transparently
disingenuous; many, if not all, of my views seem to remain sufficiently
true to the progressive cause to save me from hypocrisy or self-delusion.
So why do Michael's particular solutions to concrete social and legal
problems agree or, at least, do not jar unduly with mine?
I began reading The Limits of Freedom of Contract with these
questions in mind. I hoped to settle once and for all my puzzlement and
uneasiness. I was not disappointed. It is a powerful and sophisticated
piece of scholarship. Not only does it display commendable technical
virtuosity, but it is also full of character and passion. Whatever is said
about humdrum economists generally-that an economist is someone
who deals with graphs and figures but does not have the personality to
become an accountant-it cannot be levelled at the (unique?) brand of
law-and-economics that Michael has produced. As my CLS friend and
colleague Karl Klare puts it on the book's dust-jacket, "this is law-andeconomics with soul." Indeed, Michael has managed the rare task of
writing a book that reflects both his intellectual rigour and his humane
sensibilities. It tackles a vast sweep of social activity in a courageous,
respectful, and unsentimental way: his discussion on parenting [52] is a
fine example of his unwillingness to compromise.
But, having read the book, am I any more enlightened and less
puzzled? My answer is a resounding "YES." Initially sceptical and
prepared for the worst, I was happily surprised and relieved. In short, I
(re)learned the wisdom of that old saw that you should never judge a
book by its cover. The Limits of Freedom of Contract is much more and
much less than it promises or threatens to be-its emphasis is on the
limits to such an extent thatfreedom of contract ceases to be the unifying
or thematic focus of his inquiry. While the book has the anticipated
references to Pareto Optimality, externalities, and utility maximization,
Michael plucks such ideas from the abstract realm of idealized economic
1 M.J. Trebilcock, The Limits ofFreedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 1993) [hereinafter referred to by page numbers in square brackets].

1995]

A Postmodern Friendship

transactions and situates them in the sweat-and-tears of lived experience.
The transformation and its effect are staggering. No longer cosseted in
an artificial cocoon of hypothetical assumptions, the notions of a private
market and freedom of contract begin to look less attractive. Indeed,
Michael's analysis casts grave doubts on the possibility or desirability of
attempting to reduce the frenzy of social life to one simple and
overarching explanatory account, whatever its intellectual pedigree or
ideological inspiration. Somewhat like Moliere's unknowing Monsieur
Jourdain, Michael Trebilcock has been a postmodernist all along without
knowing it or, at least, without admitting it. Although not always
prepared to follow through on the implications of such an approach, he
that bears
can be read as offering a postmodernist's law-and-economics
2
metanarratives."
the hallmark of "an incredulity towards
Accordingly, in this short essay, I will offer a re-view of The
Limits of Freedom of Contractas an exercise in postmodern critique and
politics. The first section explores and emphasizes the considerable
extent to which Michael's book is informed by the postmodern motifs of
contingency and indeterminacy. I then move on to consider the main
difficulties, including the relation of the state and the market, which
arise because of his lack of postmodern nerve. Finally, I look at the
impoverished notion of citizenship that Michael's preoccupation with
law-and-economics suggests, and offer an enriching alternative. To give
practical pertinence to my more theoretical discussion, I will contrast
Michael's approach to the difficulties of racist practices in the
marketplace with my own approach. Ultimately, I hope to have
persuaded Michael (and the reader) that it is both intellectually
compelling and politically attractive to embrace a more open and less
hedged vision of postmodern scholarship. As one great economist might
have said, you have nothing to lose but your inhibitions, and a
postmodern world to win.
II. INDETERMINACY ALL THE WAY DOWN
At the heart of Michael's agenda is the effort to place under the
strictest scrutiny the claim that the private ordering paradigm of
contracting in a free market is the best institutional arrangement for
simultaneously promoting individual freedom and social welfare. He
maintains that this claim, if it can be justified, "would provide a
2 J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmoden Condition:A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington & B.

Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) at xxiv.
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formidable, if not decisive, normative justification for private ordering
over other forms of resource allocation in many contexts." [242] To
carry out this objective, Michael traverses and evaluates activities as
diverse as blood donation, pornography, immigration, prostitution, child
custody, racial discrimination, surrogacy, international trade, maternity
leave and, of course, commerce. His standard critical move is to look at
the operation of a "free market" in an activity, highlight a particular
failure in it (for example, commodification, coercion, information
imperfection, etc.), and suggest the costs and benefits of governmental
intervention. In each case, he attempts to reach some conclusion about
the optimal response, as between allocative and distributional
considerations, and about the optimal institutional agency, as between
courts and legislation, to achieve this.
The result of Michael's analysis in almost all cases is that it is too
close to call. Some of the best lessons from Trebilcock's work are those
about indeterminacy. The facts are always too unruly to accommodate
the principles. His major message is that life is complex-avoid
generalization. For Michael, economics is not only about making
decisions about scarce resources, but also doing so under conditions of
historical uncertainty and social instability. As opposed to the scientistic
pretensions of traditional and Marxist economics, there is no one simple
and straightforward account that can be given about economics or law
that is cogent or valid as an accurate description of what goes on, or a
reliable prescription of how to change it. The only constant about law,
economics, and their interaction is their messiness and contingency.
There is "the perennial gale of creative destruction" 3 that defies simple
logic and any theoretical attempt to privilege or hypostasize one
particular explanation is doomed to failure. The theory and practice of
economics and law are indeterminately political and politically
indeterminate. There is no non-political stance to theorizing about law
and economics; all claims to neutrality are premised on an always
undisclosed and often unperceived set of controversial normative
commitments about social interaction. 4
Michael's insistent observation is that, whatever we do in one
area of our lives, good or bad, will have obvious effects on other parts of
our lives. He draws from this important insight the implication that
discrete solutions cannot be sanctioned without understanding their
3 j. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row,

1975) at 87.
4 For an illustration of this point in the context of the relation between government regulation
and markets, see below Part III.
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larger systemic implications. Consequently, it is important-and this is
an insight of Coase-to understand that, making one area more
determinate, in the sense of introducing a clearer set of incentives and
prohibitions, will likely result in greater uncertainty elsewhere. The
world will not stay still long enough to extract one particular component,
then reinsert it in a way that leaves the rest of the world untouched, or
such that the rest of the world has not since moved on and reconfigured
itself into an entirely different set of pressures and problems. The great
challenge is not to turn uncertainty into pseudo-certainty, rendering the
world determinate and thus perfectly amenable to a once-and-for-all
evaluation, but rather to make sense of that uncertainty in a way that
respects uncertainty. Modern economics has failed spectacularly to do
this and, as Michael himself shows in spite of cautions to the contrary, so
has law-and-economics. For instance, on the choice of default rules in
incomplete contracts, Michael concludes typically that
[c]hoices between mandatory and optional default rules, and between tailored (to the
particular parties) and untailored (to classes of transactions or parties more generally)
default rules push us to the frontiers of current theorizing on the law of contracts and
perhaps reveal, rather starkly, the limits of how far theory can take us. For the moment,
"muddling through" may define our aspirational limits. [126, footnotes omitted]

Similarly, after discussing the issue of paternalism in public policymaking, not only does he acknowledge that "it is impossible to sustain a
sharp and clear divide between the domains of private and public
ordering," [163] Michael also reaches a conclusion that places faith in
sensible ad hockery and which "does not seem strikingly dissimilar from
that espoused by Duncan Kennedy." 5 [163]
Moving from specific issues to more general matters, Michael
concedes that such indeterminacy not only exists at the level of
operational efficacy, but grants that "plasticity" [246] is endemic to the
guiding principles and controlling concepts themselves; autonomy and
efficiency allow for sharp divergences in definition and range.
Moreover, there is no "meta-theory that weighs or ranks these various
values." [248] He wants to hold the line at this point, however, and
cautions against a slide into a corrosive "nihilism" in which
any set of legal rules that is likely to be constructed for governing the private ordering

process is likely to be relatively unprincipled and to reflect the personal normative whims
of judges in the case of judge-made law and similar whims on the part of legislators or

regulators in framing legislative or regulatory regimes for the contracting process. [247]

5 See D. Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law" (1982)
41 Md. L. Rev. 563. Interestingly, he also refers to Milton Friedman in support of this view: see M.
Friedman, Capitalism andFreedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962) at 33-34.
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To guard against such a fate, though, he opts for the rather trite
observations that "all the values reflected in the various normative
perspectives reviewed appear to command wide-spread public support
and to be legitimate in their own terms" [247-48], and "significant
progress can be made at a lower level of abstraction by identifying the
institutions or instruments which are best placed, among the array of
instruments and institutions available to a community, to vindicate these
values." [248]
At crucial moments, therefore, Michael loses his postmodern
nerve when he needs it most. For example, in assessing the relative
merits of case-by-case adjudication versus legislative regimes for dealing
with the pervasive tension between autonomy values and welfare
considerations, he cannot resist the temptation to tally up a final
accounting and make some decidedly non-contingent recommendations
about institutional competence and suitability. [250-68] Yet the major
thrust of his detailed analysis and survey of the relevant data is that such
a once-and-for-all reckoning is neither possible nor desirable. When
faced with these kinds of basic decisions, Michael's stark injunction is "to
think clearly" [248]: it appears that, this is the best that he is willing to
offer. This rather lame encomium, without more, is likely to pay few
intellectual dividends and lead to the even more dubious achievement of
"personal normative whims" of academics replacing those of judges and
legislators.
That having been said, there is no reason to believe that the
future history of economic arrangements will truly amount to little more
than "a random walk in socio-political space."'6 Michael fails to realize
that nihilism is merely the bogeyman of traditional epistemology: it is the
flip-side of the traditional infatuation with objective values. To concede
that it is indeterminacy all the way down is not to succumb to an
arbitrary or whimsical account of policy-making. On the contrary, it
affirms the idea that such policy-making must become a truly public and
participatory process. It does not eschew the worth of reasoned debate,
but denies the possibility of a transcendent Reason as a guide for such
debaite. There are only various and competing modes of reasoning that
are always part of, not apart from, the debate over policy-making.
Judges, policy-makers, economists, lawyers, and citizens are forever
situated in a socio-economic context that influences them as they strive
to influence it. In a world dominated by economistic thinking, the
likelihood of developing a truly participatory polity is reduced. As I will
6j.Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1975) at 167.
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suggest, it is in a practice of postmodern citizenship that the dictates of
social contingency and7 democratic participation can be optimally
balanced and respected.
III. THE STATE OF THE MARKET
Michael's work is a strong antidote to those who think that a
commitment to law-and-economics is implicitly a commitment to rightwing values. His postmodern critique, with its emphasis on contingency
and indeterminacy, shows that nothing follows, as a matter of necessity,
from any particular commitment to some abstract grand-scale values
such as equality or liberty.8 However, this is not to say that a law-andeconomics way of thinking and talking about the world does not have
certain built-in biases and informing prejudices as any account, including
my own, will have. Despite its general sophistication and erudition, one
of the most important flaws in Michael's critique is his almost
foundational insistence that it is meaningful to talk about free markets in
contrast to schemes of government regulation-that there is some
important sense in which a market can be said not to be a form of
governmental regulation. Indeed, Michael seems to go so far as to
suggest that the market is a natural or self-evidently moral arena of
social behaviour because "the perfect market, were it realized, would
constitute a morally free zone, a zone within which the constraints of
morality would have no place." 9 [29] Given such an extravagant
assumption, the market needs no moral justification, but somehow
stands as the moral underwriter for what is done in its name.
This is an entirely misconceived representation of the market, its
relation to governmental regulation, and its moral status. It is never a
question of contrasting market allocation with government distribution
because the market is one form of government regulation. Contrary to
Trebilcock's terms, government regulation is not "an endogenous
institutional arrangement," [60] but rather is essential to the basic
operation of a free market. As Frank Knight, one of the intellectual

7 See pp. 256-57, below.

8 For an excellent and more progressive analysis of some of the basic concepts of law-andeconomics, see P. Schlag, "The Problem of Transaction Costs" (1989) 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1661; and
"An Appreciative Comment On Coase's The Problemof Social Cost: A View from the Left" (1986)

Wis. L. Rev. 919. The force of these two articles is to show the indeterminacy of economic theory
and to caution against the canonization of any single form of economic regulatory organization.

9 Quoting D. Gauthier, MoralsbyAgreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 84.
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forefathers of law-and-economics recognized 70 years ago, "the [market]
system as a whole is dependent upon an outside organization, an
authoritarian state ...
to provide a setting in which it can operate at
all." 10 Without a state willing or able to define and protect property
rights, enforce contracts and prevent involuntary transactions, maintain
a circulating medium, and curtail monopoly and anti-competitive
behaviour, there is no market in any real or meaningful sense. For
example, it is ludicrous to talk about a genuine market in prostitution as
things presently stand-endemic coercion, commodification, and
exploitation are the order of the day. It is only with the advent of
government regulation through contract law, rules protecting personal
security, and employment legislation that it would be realistic to talk of a
market for prostitution; that is, unless Michael is content to treat a
"black market" as a free market, in which case any exchange of "goods"
would count as a market transaction. Moreover, the choice is never
between the allocation of goods by a decentralized market or by
centralized government administration. It is a choice among various
theories about those choices: "there is no unmeditated epistemological
access to something called 'the free market'. There are only theories
and representations of 'the free market'."11
Many implications flow from Michael's refusal to recognize this
vital and valid insight. One is that, by giving critics "the burden of
justifying intervention," [163] he skews his whole analysis in favour of
market-based solutions. Another is that it tends to cast law as a onedimensional force that only regulates and prohibits activity, rather than a
multi-faceted medium through which society continuously reconstitutes
itself and expresses its aspirations. But the most debilitating and
troubling aspect of this tendency to see the market as something
separate from governmental regulation is its effect upon the allimportant question of the nature of market actors and their preferenceformation. Traditional economics takes preferences as exogenous givens
and treats the satisfaction of such preferences as presumptively good.
Michael, of course, has little to do with such crude assumptions: "neoclassical economics essentially has no theory of how preferences are
formed ...
They have thus been viewed as exogenous to the exchange
process, which simply facilitates their realization." [147] He recognizes
that "scholars need to take more seriously the proposition that many
individual preferences are socially constructed and are amenable to
10

F. Knight, "Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost" (1924) 38 Q. J. Econ. 582 at

606.
11 Schlag, supra note 8 at 1698.
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revision." [267] However, he fails to grasp the corrosive implication of
such a recognition in, at least, two important respects.
First, although he accepts that rich and poor people develop
their preferences, at least in part, as a result of their relative positions in
the market, he still manages to depict the poor as being poor outside and
independent of the market. This is true whether he is talking about
prostitutes, surrogate mothers, beggars, etc. Moreover, he seems to
assume that, once it is recognized that many individual choices reflect
adaptive preferences, the challenge is to predict the kind of choices
people "would make in the absence of social, economic, legal, or other
influences that have shaped these preferences." [243] This is to miss the
point of a postmodern critique entirely. Michael does not grasp that
people, unless they are gods or beasts, can never be outside or "in the
absence of" such influences. Indeed, without such influences, there
would be no basis on which to generate preferences or to choose
between them; such an account is as deficient as the classical model.
People interact with and adapt to their socio-historical contexts as they
struggle to transform and adapt them: there is no outside. The real
challenge, therefore, is not to wish away the informing context and then
hazard a guess at what hypothetical choices would be made, but to work
towards creating a context in which people can and must develop and
experiment fully with their preferences. To understand this is to
is not an absence of constraints, but a particular
appreciate that freedom
12
set of constraints.
Pushed a little further, this insight leads to the second limitation
of Michael's analysis. People's identities are affected by their microsocial environments, such as family, friends, colleagues, acquaintances,
and macro-social environments, such as nationality, class, ethnicity, etc.
Consequently, in a society permeated by economic logic and market
imagery, the existing economic arrangements not only influence the kind
of substantive preferences that people have, but help shape the kind of
persons that people are or can become. For example, within the classic
vision of market actors as "preference maximizers," there is little
possibility of nurturing a social good that is more (or less) than the
aggregate of private preferences. Further, it inculcates a consumer
mentality and tutors people to be rational economic actors. This is a
very sterile and one-dimensional versiof of human activity. The market
actor is one who is cognitively supreme, possessed of both the perfectly
rational ability to analyze vast amounts of information about alternative
12 See A. Hutchinson, "Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation" (1992) 26 New Eng. L.
Rev. 1173.
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courses of action and the facility to prioritize them in terms of their
expected utility. In doing so, the ordinary consumer is also considered to
be perfectly consistent and unwavering.
Michael is silent on these matters. He fails to appreciate the
extent to which the market creates this utility-monster as much as its
acquired preferences. A major problem with this analysis is that either it
is truly artificial, and thus useless, or it becomes self-evidently trite when
it is used to explain and justify any decision by a market actor. It is not
that I think that citizens act irrationally, but that on occasion they act
non-rationally or, more usually, they follow different and often
conflicting rationalities that cannot be reduced to a set of simple-minded
directives. Insofar as a market model of human activity subsumes and
homogenizes these multiplex calculations, the individual democratic
citizen is reduced to little more than one more fungible consumer:
[O]nce we can convince ourselves that we can picture people evaluating end-states
abstracted from their social definition and that we can aspire only to create social
institutions that then passively respond to these mysterious end-state judgments, we have
moved much too far in the direction of resignation, despairing impotence, and ... nihilistic
13
skepticism about our capacity to grow.

Postmodernism suggests an alternative vision of social interaction that is
more empowering and enlightened.
IV. CITIZENS OF A POSTMODERN WORLD
In contrast to Michael's baseline of a private ordering paradigm,
I want to suggest a different starting point. Rather than taking the
market as a given, it needs to be justified as a particular kind of
government regulation among a larger mix of schemes and
arrangements. It is not exchange in and of itself that should be
encouraged, but participation and that is not exhausted by an act of
market exchange. By reducing participation to exchange, the danger is
that people will begin to think of themselves as consumers in all they do,
even when they are not in a market situation. The ambition is to ensure
that, while people are consumers some of the time, they are citizens all
of the time.14 Both civic and market politics are not so much about
13 M. Kelman, "Comment on Hoffman and Spitzer's 'Experimental Law and Economics'"
(1985) 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1037 at 1047.
14 An objection that must be faced is that the market, warts and all, is still the least worse
alternative, compared to, for example, modem Cuba, recent Russia, medieval France, etc.: see F.
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). Yet even a cursory
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substantive decisions actually made; each recognizes that the attempt to
legislate what are and are not valid substantive decisions is fraught with
historical and ideological difficulty. Accordingly, attention must be
focussed on the process through which people make those substantive
decisions. However, whereas the market obtains its authority from
people's consuming decisions, the practice of citizenship involves a more
expansive notion of participation. Markets allow only for differences
counted in terms of dollars and, therefore, the primary difference is
between the haves and have-nots. Democratic politics allows for an
expanded recognition of differences that can be counted and debated in
many different ways.
To achieve his goal of a society that can effectively debate and
integrate individual liberty and social equality, Michael needs more than
economic language and theory. Otherwise, his world will be economic
and nothing else: homo economicus rules and is hegemonic in its
ambitions. Using the jargon of economics as the language of citizenship
tends to make us think of ourselves as consumers, competitors, and
enemies, rather than as colleagues, neighbours, and friends. Like all
languages, an economic vernacular is not transparent, but contributes to
and constitutes the world in which people live. When people begin to
talk of themselves as market actors and consumers, they begin to act out
their allotted parts in a script that is not of their own making. Politics
begins to resemble commerce, victory goes to the glib and the telegenic
rather than the good and the wise, and free speech is converted into the
right to profit. In courting this economic scenario, [261] Michael's vision
of law-through-economics reduces democracy to the registering of
personal preferences through consumer choices. It elides any real
15
practice of deliberation, dialogue, judgement, and public conscience.
A good example of his failure to recognize the potential for abuse and
oppression in private concentrations of power is his discussion of press
ownership. [264] He runs the real risk of turning the politician into the
huckster and the dream of democracy into the nightmare of crass
commercialism.
Unlike the individualist cast of Michael's economic liberalism,
my competing vision would not understand society as a crude aggregate
glance around the world shows that starvation, mass unemployment, social unrest, ethnic wars, race
riots, environmental despoilation, eta have not been eradicated or tamed by liberal democracy's
supposed sweep of all before it: see J. Derrida, The Specters ofMarx: The State ofDebt, the Work of
Mourning,& the New International,trans. P. Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994).

15 See J.B. Elshtain, Democracy on Trial, (Concord, Ont.: House of Anansi Press, 1993) at 2830; and A. Hutchinson, "Money Talk: Against Constitutionalizing (Constitutional) Speech" (1992)
17 Can. J. Bus. L 2.
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of separate things, but as connected cells in a thriving organism.
Individuals are not universal and abstract moral entities, but are situated
within a local and concrete context; they are political beings with
particular historical and social affiliations. Between people, a sense of
belonging and reciprocal responsibility for others would be fostered.
Freedom, rather than being viewed as contractual in origin and static in
nature, would be understood more organically and dynamically.
Accepting that the social whole is much greater than the haphazard
aggregation of its individual parts, personal worth and self-esteem would
be embedded in and nourished by affective affiliations: "solidarity is the
social face of love. ' 16 Personal liberty without public responsibility is, at
best, hollow and unsatisfying; at worst, it is uncivil and corrupting.
Instead of relying upon transcendent values and abstract rationality, the
search for social justice would be based upon a practical reason that is
contextual and contingent in character; flights of metaphysical musing
would become hopelessly fanciful and indulgent. The political agora and
the economic marketplace would cease to be simply arenas for the
confrontation of competing wills and the satisfaction of individual wants,
and would become crucibles in which to forge a common good.
Although a revitalized practice of citizenship has a rich and
distinguished past, its contemporary significance and potential has
largely been overshadowed by rights-talk-of which Michael's economic
argot is but one manifestation-which has hijacked citizenship and made
it subservient to its particular civic agenda. In the economic and liberal
almanac, citizenship is little more than "the right to have rights":1 7 this is
the abasement of citizenship, not its apotheosis. If there is to be a
serious effort to move away from rights-talk's "dialogue of despair"18 to
democracy's conversation of hope, the rights-holder must give way to the
citizen in the political scheme of things. Of course, the kind of citizens
that people can be is affected by the kind of society and community in
which they live. However, an enhanced concept and practice of
citizenship can begin to transform the society and community in which
people live, so that they view themselves as participants in a larger civic
project and see others not only as threats to freedom and fulfillment.
Citizenship is more a social activity than an individual status as it allows
people to inhabit the contested terrain between individual rights and
16 R. Unger, Law in Modem Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: Free
Press, 1976) at 206.
17
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 102 (1958), Warren CJ.
18

M. Glendon, Rights Talk-The Impoverishment of PoliticalDiscourse (New York: Free Press,
1991) at 182.
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communal Right by colonizing it in the name of democracy. Neither
individualistic nor communitarian, the enhanced concept of citizenship
recognizes that any vision of "the good life" is always provisional and
contingent. There is no fixed or final version of what amounts to the
best way to live: the good life is to be found in the details of living,
socially and privately, which must be constantly re-worked and renegotiated. Whereas liberals put representative democracy in the
service of private values, and Marxists imagine that direct democracy will
bring an end to politics, participatory citizens accept that the relation
between public virtue and private values is open to revisable articulation,
and that the attraction of democracy is its promise to keep politics
permanently open and fluid. As such, citizenship under radical
democracy is not committed to one common good, but to a practice of
engaged civility in which the common good is always up for
consideration and conversion. For the democratic citizen, a good life
consists in public-spirited engagement with others over the shape and
substance of "the good life."
Within a democratic dialogue of citizenship, it is possible to
integrate homo economicus and its rights-talk into a much broader and
deeper conversational context. The notion of the "free market" and its
abstract denizens would not be outside or beyond political authority, but
would be within its bailiwick. Crucially, this would allow the notion of
"responsibility" to occupy a similar place in the economic and
democratic conscience as the notion of rights currently does. Whereas
economic actors and rights-holders exist in an abstract realm of optional
interactions with anonymous others, the citizen is located in an historical
time and in a local place where personal and social living unfold in a web
of connections between real people, some of whom are known and liked,
while others are not. This implies that, in exercising their rights and
making claims, people would have to take into account their
responsibilities to others, particularly those less fortunate and more
vulnerable than themselves. Actions and practices would have to be
evaluated within the socio-historical context of the democratic
community: the particular mix of entitlements and responsibilities would
always be reconfigurable in light of contingent concerns.
The appeal and limits of Michael's cherished economic
liberalism both flow from the same sources for "at the heart of19this ethic
lies a vision of the person that both inspires and undoes it." At the
same time that it offers the prospect of empowering individuals and
19 M. Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and The Unencumbered Self" (1984) 12 Pol. Theory
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rescuing them from collective tyranny, rights-talk also stifles the
possibility of truly progressive social change. As an historical artifact,
rights-talk has played a positive role in social struggle and retains
obvious strengths, such as the emphasis on the value of human dignity,
physical protection, distrust of bureaucracy, and worth of rational
justification. 2 However, homo economicus has overthrown the divine
right of kings, clergy, and aristocracy only to replace it with the
sovereignity of the abstract individual-God in a more philosophical and
less theological uniform. Rights-talk treats people as abstract
individuals rather than as situated citizens whose lives are currently
constrained as well as potentially satisfiable within their relational
contexts. Like all ways of seeing and comprehending the world,
economic rights-talk distorts as much as it illuminates; it tends to shape
the world in its own political image. The individualistic and economistic
vision of rights-talk depicts individuals as separate and egoistic, striving
for a liberty that is self-regarding and a sociability that is hollow, each
with equal capacity to use those rights. As such, rights-talk provides an
inherently false account of human community both in its present
practice and future possibilities. A rights-centric society becomes little
more than an aggregate of self-interested individuals who only band
together to facilitate the pursuit of their own uncoordinated,
independent, and rationally-chosen life projects-a relation of strategic
convenience and opportunism rather than mutual commitment and
support. Rights become simply another commodity to be traded in the
marketplace of humanity, and act as a barrier separating people from
genuine communion with their fellow citizens.
In calling for the abandonment of markets as the organizing
theoretical and organizational paradigm for civic interaction, I am not to
be taken as making some commitment to a discredited and disavowed
model of a state-planned economy. Any lingering faith in the possibility
that a planned distribution of goods and services through bureaucratic
channels might be the best alternative to a free-market ideology is to be
thoroughly debunked and discarded; such polarized thinking is entirely
antithetical to a postmodern and democratic way of proceeding. The
mainstream notions of unified economic actors with fixed preferences,
instrumental causality, and objective rationality are also preoccupations
of Marxian economic thought. Indeed, Mardan economic thought sees
itself as making up for and correcting the relativism, uncertainty, and
indeterminacy of the mainstream models of economic theorizing.
However, in the same way that Marxian economists have been quick to
20 See E. Wolfgast, The Grammarof Justice (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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overemphasize the disordered and negative nature of capitalist markets,
they have exaggerated the ordered and positive consequences of a stateplanned economic order.2 1 Neither a market-based nor a planned
economy is as predictable, rational, or controlled as its apologists
contend. The search for a structural and ahistorical foundation that can
account convincingly for present economic behaviour and that can
forecast confidently future economic arrangements is misconstrued:
contingency is incorrigible and indeterminacy is inextinguishable. At
different times and in different ways, the postmodern policy-maker must
be prepared to adopt a variety of strategies and interventions that draw
pragmatically on the imagery of both neoclassical market thinking and
its Marxian critique as viewed from a suitably postmodern, nonessentialist, and historically-situated perspective.
Most importantly, those lawyers, economists, and scholars who
are committed to progressive action in a postmodern world must resist
the temptation to seek theoretical finality and practical dogma: closure is
always contrived, frequently arbitrary, and usually conducive to
established power relations. Relieved of Michael's anxiety to craft
solutions that are somehow apt for all times and places, they can
concentrate on the pressing problems of contemporary Canadian society
and experiment with interventions that can best address the prevailing
institutional structures of power. At his postmodern best, Michael
recognizes this imperative but, at his modernist worst, he ignores its
force at his and everyone else's peril. Michael's pressing and persistent
challenge should not be, as he mistakenly insists, how best to maximize
personal autonomy and individual entitlement. Rather, he should be
more concerned to fathom how best to incorporate such values with the
equally important virtues of social solidarity and the acknowledgement
of difference. A major item on the political agenda of the truly
democratic state will be the need to accomodate diversity and plurality
without disaggregating to such an extent that the citizens do not act as a
civic community. In place of rights-talk's willingness to go along with a
me/them mentality, civic citizenship and the participatory state
encourage a me/we involvement: it understands that the fate of each of
us is unavoidably tied to the fate of all of us and that the self and the
21 J. Amariglio & D. Ruccio, "Postmodemism, Marxism, and the Critique of Modem
Economic Thought" (1994) 7 Rethinking Marxism 7 at 21. This is also the case from a feminist
economic perspective. Several writers identify and reject the totalizing, constructed, and male
tendencies of traditional neoclassical theories: see S. Feiner & B. Roberts, "Hidden By The
Invisible Hand: Neoclassical Economic Theory and the Textbook Treatment of Race and Gender"

(1990) 4 Gender & Soe'y 159; and J. Nelson, "Gender, Metaphor, and the Definition of Economics"
(1992) 8 Econ. & Phil. 103.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 33 NO. 2

collective are not antagonistic entities, but complementary components
of a political community. In an important sense, democratic
conversation's opportunity is found in rights-talk's failure. Today's
rights-holders, and especially their articulate and sophisticated
representatives like Michael, must be prepared to take that chance for
tomorrow's citizens.
V. LIFE AFTER SHOPPING
In this section, I wish to show how the kind of theorizing in which
Michael engages has operated to insulate prevailing structures and
ideologies from lasting or profound change. For all the hard work of the
consumer lobby, the increasing domination of homo economicus is
illustrated by the fact that public discourse has become hostage to
economics and has begun to dance to, instead of call, the economic tune:
it is thoroughly infiltrated by the economic mind-set and attuned to its
interests. People think of themselves primarily as consumers rather than
citizens. The middle-class weaknesses of ostentation and envy are
exploited; Yuppiedom becomes its own political credo and lifestyle.
Electoral politics is eviscerated and reduced to hollow spectacle; form
triumphs over substance by converting it into its own empty reflection.
The effect of such a commercially-saturated atmosphere is to trivialize
and impoverish democratic politics as well as life itself. "You live; you
shop; you die"-that is the motto of modern Western societies. And,
notwithstanding the considerable benefits that it has brought, it also
promises to be its epitaph. Moreover, the cheery optimism of many
1970s law reformers, among whom Michael's was a leading voice,22 has
given way to a sombre pessimism-evidence of the failure of those
reforms to disturb radically rather than merely reduce marginally the
oppressive operation of a liberal capitalist economy.
My immediate task is to demonstrate how this situation has come
to pass and to suggest ways in which it might be possible to effect a more
genuine transformation in social life and politics-one that shifts the
civic fulcrum from that of shoppers, with their individual parcels of
rights and acquisitions, to that of citizens, with their social
responsibilities and well-being. In doing this, I will build on the
impressive body of work that my friend and colleague Iain Ramsay has
been assembling. As I read it, he has sought to move beyond traditional
22 See M. Trebilcock, "Consumer Protection in the Affluent Society" (1969) 16 McGill L.J.
263; see also J. Ziegel, "The Future of Canadian Consumerism" (1973) 51 Can. Bar Rev. 191.
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analyses and to propose a different discourse within which to frame and
address the problems that are traditionally associated with consumer law
and policy. As he puts it, "consumer law seems to be a particularly
[that] is neither obviously a prop for the
postmodern form of law ...

status quo nor an instrument of social transformation." 23 It is as much
about alienation and consciousness as it is about economic power. Law
in general and consumer law in particular have not only an instrumental
and economic function, but also operate in ways that are more symbolic
and cultural. Like Ramsay, I want to work toward an emancipatory
culture that goes beyond the rhetoric of markets, consumers, and rights
and begins to re-align itself around a civic discourse of citizenship.
Accordingly, I contribute a postmodern effort that eschews a belief in
grand narratives that either describe the ills of society or offer a single
sweeping remedy for its improvement. Instead of Michael's shoppers, I
offer Allan's citizens.
One aspect of consumer law and practice that has taxed
reformers and theorists alike is the need to curb racism and sexism in the
marketplace. Much progress has been made in eradicating the more
overt and egregious forms of discrimination that have blighted the sale
of goods and services. A combination of consumer legislation and
human rights codes has outlawed those barriers and practices that keep
people of colour and women from participating fully qua women or
people of colour in the give-and-take of the marketplace. While there is
an acknowledged need for more robust enforcement and education, the
panoply of laws in place are considered to be sufficient to tackle the
problem. In keeping with the overall tenor and thrust of rights-talk, the
assumption was that, once people broke through the formal and artificial
barriers that had previously excluded them from access to certain
services and shops, the competitive discipline of the market and
individual sellers' profit motive would ensure commercial equality;
money was a transparent medium that had no particular race or gender.
The substantive nature of any deal sought and obtained would still vary
in accordance with the parties' ability and capacity to bargain and
negotiate effectively, but in this regard female and black consumers
would be in no better and no worse a position than any other purchaser.
For sellers or providers of services to discriminate in pricing on the basis
of the buyers' race would be a case of cutting off one's nose to spite
23 I. Ramsay, "Consumer Law and Structures of Thought: A Comment" (1993) 16 J. Cons.
Pol. 79 at 91. See also I. Ramsay, Consumer Protection: Text and Materials (Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, 1989); and "Consumer Law and The Search For Empowerment" (1991) 19

Can. Bus. L.J. 397.
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one's face: bigoted sellers would be at a competitive disadvantage and
ultimately be driven out of the market. Although such discriminatory
price-fixing might occur among the more recalcitrant of sub-markets, it
would be occasional and perverse rather than systemic and prevalent.
However, recent studies strongly suggest that not only is there
still rampant and widespread discrimination in the marketplace, but that
the available legal solutions and, in particular, the thinking behind them
are not up to the task of rooting out actual or potential racism in
consumer practices. In a much-discussed and sophisticated article about
negotiating for the purchase of new cars, Ian Ayres came to the stark
conclusion that "white males receive significantly better prices than
blacks and women."'24 For example, as well as disclosing that a very
different style and substance of negotiating was used by dealers
depending on the identity of the prospective purchaser, the profit that
dealers made from black women was almost quadruple that made from
white men. These results occurred in situations where the class and
other relevant consumer characteristics (dress, attractiveness, etc.) of the
testers were constant across race and gender. Also, in a revealing
finding, it was discovered that the worst (or best?) deals were often
made between salespersons and buyers of the same race and gender.
Although Ayres concluded that "the results of this study can be
described as a set of facts in search of a more complete causal theory,"
he did insist that "whatever its causes, however, the discrimination
revealed in this study stands squarely in the face of earlier analysis" that
there would not be widespread price variation within and across dealers
on the basis of gender and race. 2S
To combat such discrimination, Ayres offered several
suggestions for legal reforms and consumer protection remedies; they
are the exactly the kind of serious proposals that I believe a similarly
troubled Michael would make. The first is to resort to a more beefed-up
version of existing contract law in the form of the "substantive
unconscionability" doctrine. However, the likelihood of success for such
a strategy is very low in light of the courts' dismal record in pursuing a
24 . Ayres, "Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiating" (1991)
104 Harv. L. Rev. 817 at 819. There are a number of empirical-type problems with this study-not
the least of which is the fact the testers were only required to engage in a set series of negotiating

tactics; they were not obliged to close an actual sale. In particular, there is no real study of what
would have happened if the dealers had been faced with making no deal unless they dropped their
prices. Nevertheless, I do not think that this limitation in Ayres' research impairs or invalidates the
conclusions that I draw from it. The basic thesis stands up to scrutiny-that different people were
treated differently on the basis of their race and gender.
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robust campaign against individual dealers, and their lack of appetite for
such substantive intervention. Discouraged, Ayres goes on to
recommend two other, regulatory-type strategies for reform. Whereas
one would legislate a permissible price dispersion on a range of products
and services such that dealers would be penalized for excessive markups,
another would mandate disclosure by sellers of extensive information
(for example, wholesale price, average profits, etc.) that would be
valuable to consumers. While it is true that both these strategies would
strike at the heart of the problem and, therefore, warrant support, their
underlying rationale draws upon a very different rhetoric and political
theory than the more traditional solutions to market failure. Indeed,
their potential efficacy arises from the very fact that they impliedly query
and reject the "truck and barter" mentality of a generation of economists
weaned on a puritan diet of bargaining exchange. Ayres' proposed
remedies (and what I suggest would be Michael's likely response) do not
so much compensate and adjust for market failure, but rather challenge
the whole operation of the market and its accompanying imagery as the
prime institutional and ideological device for the distribution of goods
and services.
The most that consumer laws, based on a market-failure model
and framed in economic terms, can do is attempt to place consumers in a
position to make the best deals that they are able to do. Whereas human
rights law works to overcome the formal barriers that prevent or
disadvantage one party from negotiating with another, the common law
rules of misrepresentation, duress, fraud, mistake, and the like only
place substantive limits on the kind of bargain that can be struck. What
they do not do-in progressive or liberal guise-is to ban or challenge
the idea of a bargain in a free market. There is no such thing as a
market price, only one that the buyer and seller negotiate. While
banning certain bargaining techniques deemed to be presumptively
unfair and correcting for excessive imbalances of economic power, the
whole of the liberal legal and social regime allows buyers and sellers to
make the best deal that they can-where best is measured solely with
reference to the buyers' and sellers' own self-interest. Concern for any
communal good is, at best, an incidental issue that has no direct bearing
on the particular bargain at hand. Indeed, the bulk of existing pricecontrol regulation is devoted to ensuring that prices are not fixed and
that the play of competition is left largely uncontrolled, so that the
market is allowed to work in a fair and so-called natural way.
Based as it is on an over-utilized notion of market failure and an
under-theorized idea of consumer preferences, economic rights-talk i la
Michael manages to reinforce rather than transform the structures and
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assumptions of liberal capitalism: it expresses a tolerant market morality
in which the right to act against the common good has to be conceded,
albeit reluctantly, a significant role.2 6 Even those who champion the
values of trust, fairness, and cooperation in an alternative vision of
contract still operate within the broad confines of the market and an
exchange ideology. Whereas liberalism and rights-talk is all about the
art of the deal, a discourse of citizenship not only allows us to correct for
the failures of the market, but it incorporates a discussion about the kind
of people we are and can become in our struggle to negotiate not only
deals, but our lives. Bargaining is not a natural human attribute, but a
function of the social conditions in which people are nurtured and
formed. All that consumer rights mentality can do is to reinforce that
rather than re-imagine social beings who are not reducible to and
determined by the economic conditions in which they live. Insofar as
people are consumers, they are also citizens in a social arrangement that
encompasses, but is not exhausted by, the market. Shopping is part of
life, but the "shop-until-you drop" consumer need not be an individual's
main or only self-image: the languages of consumption and competition
are best nurtured in a fuller conversational ethic of trust and
collaboration.
By re-presenting the problem of racism and sexism in the
marketplace in the discursive framework of democratic citizenship, it
becomes possible to tackle such debilitating practices directly and
systemically. Instead of evaluating consumer practices in terms of
bargaining and deal-making, the evaluative focus can shift to the civic
lights of participation and consent. Both of these notions are detectable
in existing law, but they currently play a minor and marginalized role and
tend to be procedural and piecemeal in intent and operation. 27 Suitably
expanded and informed by a democratic impetus, these institutional
imperatives can place greater emphasis on the mutual responsibilities
between people. On this dialogic understanding, participation comprises
much more than the expenditure of money to register and satisfy
preferences that are deemed to be, at least in some part, exogenous to
the consumer process: it allows citizens to exercise an active and direct
26 See E. Andrew, Shylock's Rights: A Grammarof Lockian Claims (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1988) 12-21.
27 I am thinking here of the common law doctrines of informed consent in tort law and
misrepresentation in contract law: see C. Boyle & D. Percy, eds., Contracts: Cases and
Commentaries,5th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1994) at 359-77. For a suggestive account of
how such doctrines can be invigorated in the service of democratic ends, see A.C. Hutchinson,
Dwelling on the Threshold: CriticalEssays on Modem Legal Thought, (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at
215-22.
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part in the overall political process through which preferences are
generated, challenged, confirmed and met. Of course, what amounts to
the common good at any time and in any interaction is not fixed or final,
but is always up for grabs. However, such a different way of formulating
and scrutinizing consumer relations does allow the idea of public virtue
to be combined with the pursuit of private interests. Framed in this way,
a democratic model of economic activity suggests the development of
more community-based and local initiatives that reflect and encourage a
"me/us" rather than "me/them" sensibility of cooperation. While there
is no guarantee that a civic conversation of democratic citizenship will
eradicate sexism and racism in the marketplace, it will have a much
better chance of success than the attenuated discourse of rights-talk and
economic rationality.
When P.G. Wodehouse, the English comic novelist, was asked if
he spoke Spanish, he said "I don't know: I've never tried." Legal,
economic, and law-and-economics commentators would do well to heed
that open-minded attitude and begin to experiment more
transformatively with different structures and arrangements for the
formation and satisfaction of people's preferences as consumer-citizens.
The kind of rights-talk and market ideology that Michael espouses is not
equal to that task; it only tends to make the best of a bad job and
legitimate the problem, rather than resolve it. Even at their most ideal,
consumer rights can only hold in check the vices of racism and other
kinds of civically-debilitating discrimination. In contrast, a shift from
rights-talk to democratic dialogue can challenge such social cancers
fundamentally and directly. It is not enough to be happy shoppers and
marketeers. It is better that people strive to be good citizens in a jolly
community that treats all as worthy and deserving, whether rich or poor.
The dominant narrative paradigm of pervasive consumerism must be
While I am not
challenged, fragmentized, and contextualized.
suggesting that a postmodern dialogue of citizenship is the only possible
alternative to extant market-driven rights-talk, or that such a civic
conversation leads to any necessary or determinate recommendations, I
do maintain that it is the least undesirable complement to a social
commitment to a robust and direct mode of democratic governance. In
short, more democracy-less capitalism.
VI. THE BOTTOM LINE
So can Michael and I remain friends? I hope so. Even if
understanding why we agree causes us to disagree more, it ought not to
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be a gap that is too hard to bridge. There is much in his work to ponder
and learn from. In particular, I agree entirely that, in the same way that
the political right cannot ignore issues of redistribution, "progressives
cannot exclusively pre-occupy themselves with issues of redistribution."
[258] There is too much mutual suspicion that leads to an unproductive
stand-off. Instead, Michael argues for a "new convergence between
economic and social policy-making around the role of the state in
promoting the development of human capital." [260] This is an
admirable and noble ambition, provided that the state is understood in
the postmodern language of democratic participation and institutional
experimentation.2 8 As postmodern friends, Michael and I might join to
re-invigorate the jaded imagination of late twentieth-century citizens.
That's my Michael!
What is the price of experience? Do men buy it for a song?
Or wisdom for a dance in the street? No it is bought with the price
Of all that man hath-His house, his wife, his children.
Wisdom is sold in the desolate market where none come to buy
It is an easy thing to triumph in the summer's sun
And in the vintage and to sing on the wagon loaded with corn.
It is an easy thing to talk of patience to the afflicted
To speak the law of prudence to the homeless wanderer.
It is an easy thing to rejoice in the tents of prosperity
Thus could I sing & thus rejoice: but it is not so with me!29

28

See A.C. Hutchinson, Waitingfor Coraf.A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University

of Toronto Press, 1995) c. 8.

29 W. Blake, "America" and "The Four Zoas" in D. Erdman, ed., The Complete Poetry and
Proseof William Blake (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) at 53 and 325.

